Tuesday, January 06, 2009

Cognitive Neuroscience Links 01/06/2009


Posted from Diigo. The rest of my favorite links are here.

Monday, January 05, 2009

Voodoo Correlations


Posted from Diigo. The rest of my favorite links are here.

Saturday, January 26, 2008

Book for Spring Discussion


Our book for this spring's discussion is Joseph LeDoux's The Synaptic Self. For more information about the book go to the Synaptic Self home page.

We'll meet every other Wednesday in SC 200 at noon. Bring you lunch.

Friday, December 28, 2007

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

Book Selection for Spring 2008

I put together a list of books we might consider for our discussion in spring 2008. I'm sure I forgot a few that were recommended to me recently, so let me know if there is something you'd like to see on the list that I left off. Please look the list over and get back to me with your favorites (perhaps name a few in rank order). I'll summarize the results sometime in the next two weeks and get back to you.

Friday, October 26, 2007

UC Philosophy Colloquia Fall 2007

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Larry Shapiro
Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin

“Making Sense of Mirror Neurons”

Abstract:
Although the question is at least as old as Aristotle, philosophers have said little about how to distinguish one sensory modality from another. Scientists (no offense to Aristotle) have fairly unreflectively assumed distinctions between sensory modalities. Clearly, we need answers to why one sensory modality is distinct from another in order to answer questions such as: How many sensory systems do human beings possess? What would count as evidence that an organism has a sensory system that human beings lack? Do prosthetic sensory systems (e.g. Paul Bach-y-rita's device that uses pressure points on the back or tongue to convey visual information) replicate or only simulate "real" sensory systems? Grice (1962) provided a useful starting point for answers to these questions. Coady, Roxbee Cox, and Heil have said a few things in response to Grice, but not until recently has the issue come alive again (Keeley, Gray, Nudds). In this paper I find fault with various proposals for the individuation of the senses and then provide listeners with the benefit of the correct answer. Perhaps surprisingly, consistent with my account of the senses, mirror neurons turn out to be sensory organs.


FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Rocco Gennaro
Professor of Philosophy, Indiana State University

“Representational Theories of Consciousness”

Abstract:
Consciousness continues to be one of the most important and perplexing areas of philosophy of mind. One popular philosophical approach to explaining consciousness is known as “representational theories of consciousness.” I'll begin with various definitional and background matters, such as "How is 'conscious' defined?" "What is a mental representation?" and "What is the relationship between consciousness and intentionality?" I will then discuss motivations for and varieties of representational theories. Such theories have in common the idea that conscious mental states can be explained in terms of representational (or intentional) relations and are generally
reductionistic in spirit. For example, the representationalist will typically hold that the phenomenal properties of experience (i.e. qualia) can be explained in terms of the experiences’ representational properties (or content). The central question to be answered is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? This talk will critically review a number of prominent representational theories, including first-order theories (e.g. Michael Tye), higher-order thought theory (e.g. David Rosenthal), the higher-order perception model (e.g. Bill Lycan), as well as self-representational approaches to consciousness. Thus, various representational theories will be explained and criticisms of each will be discussed. I also present my own preferred version of HOT theory.


FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Valerie Hardcastle
Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the McMicken College of Arts and Sciences, University of Cincinnati

“Reduction, Emergence, and Complexity: The Case of Obesity”

Abstract
Reductionists and emergentists both assume that reality is hierarchically organized by part-whole relations. The real difference between the two ontological views turns on the notion of downward causation. In this presentation, I argue that neither approach, as traditionally understood, fits well with the latest experimental and theoretical advances in science. I illustrate this claim by looking at our current understanding of obesity
as an example.

Thursday, September 06, 2007

Blumberg Discussions

This fall semester we will be discussing Mark Blumberg's book Basic Instinct. [Amazon] We'll every other Monday from noon to 1:00 in SC 200. Mark the following dates on your calendar:

September 17
October 1
October 22
November 5
November 19
December 3

Sunday, August 26, 2007

Fall 2007 books

Here are some candidates for our reading group this semester.

Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, by Chris Frith (Blackwell, 2007). [Amazon, $24.95]
Inside your head there is an amazing labor-saving device; more effective than the latest high-tech computer. Your brain frees you from the everyday tasks of moving about in the world around you, allowing you to concentrate on the things that are important to you: making friends and influencing people. However, the 'you' that is released into this social world is also a construction of your brain. It is your brain that enables you to share your mental life with the people around you. Making up the Mind is the first accessible account of experimental studies showing how the brain creates our mental world. Using evidence from brain imaging, psychological experiments, and studies with patients, Chris Frith, one of the world's leading neuroscientists, explores the relationship between the mind and the brain.

How the Body Shapes the Mind, by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford, 2006). [Amazon, $25.45]
How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher's book aims to contribute to the formulation of that common vocabulary and to develop a conceptual framework that will avoid both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Gallagher pursues two basic sets of questions. The first set consists of questions about the phenomenal aspects of the structure of experience, and specifically the relatively regular and constant features that we find in the content of our experience. If throughout conscious experience there is a constant reference to one's own body, even if this is a recessive or marginal awareness, then that reference constitutes a structural feature of the phenomenal field of consciousness, part of a framework that is likely to determine or influence all other aspects of experience. The second set of questions concerns aspects of the structure of experience that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before we know it. They do not normally enter into the content of experience in an explicit way, and are often inaccessible to reflective consciousness. To what extent, and in what ways, are consciousness and cognitive processes, which include experiences related to perception, memory, imagination, belief, judgement, and so forth, shaped or structured by the fact that they are embodied in this way?

Why Choose This Book?: How We Make Decisions, by Read Montegue (Dutton Adult, 2006). [Amazon, $16.47]
Why do we choose chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream? Why do we select one lover rather than another? Baylor University neuroscientist Montague (now a fellow at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study) deftly marries psychology and neuroscience as he probes how we make choices. On one hand, decision making boils down to simple computation. Montague argues that our brains are efficient computational machines. But unlike computers, our brains fix on the goals of survival and reproduction, realizing that every hasty decision can be costly to the survival of the species. Our brains also harbor experiences (memories) that foster the choices we make. On the other hand, we can make choices that go against survival: for instance, we can choose to die for an idea. Why is that? Because, says Montague, human computations involve valuation, choosing between one value and another, requiring computation of cultural and psychological qualities. Although the notion of the brain as a computational machine can be traced at least as far back as Descartes, Montague adds new ideas to our understanding of how our brains compute. But his sometimes engaging and sometimes plodding book doesn't always explain the complex science for general readers.

Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, by Neil Levy (Cambridge,, 2007). [Amazon $34.65]
Neuroscience has dramatically increased understanding of how mental states and processes are realized by the brain, thus opening doors for treating the multitude of ways in which minds become dysfunctional. This book explores questions such as when is it permissible to alter a person's memories, influence personality traits or read minds? What can neuroscience tell us about free will, self-control, self-deception and the foundations of morality? The view of neuroethics offered here argues that many of our new powers to read ,alter and control minds are not entirely unparalleled with older ones. They have, however, expanded to include almost all our social, political and ethical decisions. Written primarily for graduate students, this book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the more philosophical and ethical aspects of the neurosciences.

Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior, by Mark Blumberg (Thunder's Mouth, 2006) [Amazon, $11.66]
This is a passionate (and at times polemical) survey of what contemporary neuroscience has to say about the nature of instinct. Actually, as it turns out, it might be more accurate to say the "nurture" of instinct, since Blumberg firmly argues against the perspective that what we think of as instincts are innate—he reframes "instincts," ranging from a baby's tendency to mimic faces to monkeys' fear of snakes, as a consequence of reflexes rather than innate knowledge. Though initially a bit dense with scientific jargon, the book picks up midway through, and the then generally accessible prose skillfully unpacks behaviors that seem instinctive, ranging from the mundane (getting thirsty) to the astonishing (androgenital licking in newborn rats). The writing is as persuasive as it is rich in intriguing detail, and a reader may well find that, by the end of the book, the word "nativism" (the perspective that animals and humans are born with cognitive instincts in place, which Blumberg at one point calls "an intellectual and experimental red herring") has become a dirty word.

Friday, June 22, 2007

The Amygdaloids

The Amygdaloids (with neuroscientist Joe LeDoux) play for the NYU graduation at Madison Square Garden.

Tuesday, June 19, 2007

Sapolsky on Stress

Robert Sapolsky talks about 'Stress, Neurodegeneration and Individual Differences.'



From Google Video

Monday, June 18, 2007

From Animal to Person

In this podcast Dan Dennett speaks speaks to the New York Academy of Sciences about the evolution of human culture. (From Science & the City)

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Summer Book Suggestions

Below are three candidates for our summer reading group. Let me know if there are other suggestions. I'll post a survey soon with which we can select a book and a meeting time.

Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior (Blumberg) [Amazon, $11.66]
This is a passionate (and at times polemical) survey of what contemporary neuroscience has to say about the nature of instinct. Actually, as it turns out, it might be more accurate to say the "nurture" of instinct, since Blumberg firmly argues against the perspective that what we think of as instincts are innate—he reframes "instincts," ranging from a baby's tendency to mimic faces to monkeys' fear of snakes, as a consequence of reflexes rather than innate knowledge. Though initially a bit dense with scientific jargon, the book picks up midway through, and the then generally accessible prose skillfully unpacks behaviors that seem instinctive, ranging from the mundane (getting thirsty) to the astonishing (androgenital licking in newborn rats). The writing is as persuasive as it is rich in intriguing detail, and a reader may well find that, by the end of the book, the word "nativism" (the perspective that animals and humans are born with cognitive instincts in place, which Blumberg at one point calls "an intellectual and experimental red herring") has become a dirty word.

Why Choose This Book?: How We Make Decisions (Read Montague) [Amazon, $16.47]
From Publishers Weekly:
Why do we choose chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream? Why do we select one lover rather than another? Baylor University neuroscientist Montague (now a fellow at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study) deftly marries psychology and neuroscience as he probes how we make choices. On one hand, decision making boils down to simple computation. Montague argues that our brains are efficient computational machines. But unlike computers, our brains fix on the goals of survival and reproduction, realizing that every hasty decision can be costly to the survival of the species. Our brains also harbor experiences (memories) that foster the choices we make. On the other hand, we can make choices that go against survival: for instance, we can choose to die for an idea. Why is that? Because, says Montague, human computations involve valuation, choosing between one value and another, requiring computation of cultural and psychological qualities. Although the notion of the brain as a computational machine can be traced at least as far back as Descartes, Montague adds new ideas to our understanding of how our brains compute. But his sometimes engaging and sometimes plodding book doesn't always explain the complex science for general readers. (Nov.)

Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Peter J. Richerson, Robert Boyd) [Amazon, $19.00]
Humans are a striking anomaly in the natural world. While we are similar to other mammals in many ways, our behavior sets us apart. Our unparalleled ability to adapt has allowed us to occupy virtually every habitat on earth using an incredible variety of tools and subsistence techniques. Our societies are larger, more complex, and more cooperative than any other mammal's. In this stunning exploration of human adaptation, Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd argue that only a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution can explain these unique characteristics.

Not by Genes Alone offers a radical interpretation of human evolution, arguing that our ecological dominance and our singular social systems stem from a psychology uniquely adapted to create complex culture. Richerson and Boyd illustrate here that culture is neither superorganic nor the handmaiden of the genes. Rather, it is essential to human adaptation, as much a part of human biology as bipedal locomotion. Drawing on work in the fields of anthropology, political science, sociology, and economics—and building their case with such fascinating examples as kayaks, corporations, clever knots, and yams that require twelve men to carry them—Richerson and Boyd convincingly demonstrate that culture and biology are inextricably linked, and they show us how to think about their interaction in a way that yields a richer understanding of human nature.

In abandoning the nature-versus-nurture debate as fundamentally misconceived, Not by Genes Alone is a truly original and groundbreaking theory of the role of culture in evolution and a book to be reckoned with for generations to come.

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Moral Minds links

Here are some links to sites that are related to our discussion of Marc Hauser's Moral Minds.

Rorty's review of MM in the NY Times.

Edsten and Richerson Review of MM at American Scientist Online.

The Books and Publicity page from Hauser's website.

Mixing Memory Blog: Where is morality in the brain? Sequel is here.

Brain Ethics Blog with an excellent bibliography of neuroethics readings.

The Moral Sense Test at Harvard.

Carl Zimmer Who's Life Would You Save? Discover (2004)

Neuroethics homepage at UPenn

Joshua Greene's home page is here, with links to many of his articles on neuroscientific research on ethics. Below are a few select articles:

Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul
I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine moral reasoning. These claims are strictly empirical, and I will defend them on the basis of the available evidence. Needless to say, my argument will be speculative and will not be conclusive. Beyond this, I will argue that if these empirical claims are true, they may have normative implications, casting doubt on deontology as a school of normative moral thought.

Joshua Greene, et al. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, Science 293 (2001)
In two functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.

Joshua Greene, et al. The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, Neuron 44 (2004)
Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize reasoning
and “higher cognition,” while more recent work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment according to which both “cognitive” and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes mutually competitive roles.

Thursday, December 28, 2006

MORAL MINDS: spring 2007

Marc Hauser's Moral Minds (Amazon | B&N) is our book for discussion this spring. Selections on neuroethics came in second and will probably be our topic this summer. Information about the time and place of the spring meetings will be posted later.

Sunday, December 10, 2006

Book Selection for Spring 2007

So what book do we want to discuss in the spring? I created a survey instrument at Survey Monkey on which you can indicate your preferences. Please go HERE and select your TWO favorite options. Summaries of the candidates are listed below. Thanks. --Rudy

Basic Instinct (Blumberg) [Amazon, $10.17]

This is a passionate (and at times polemical) survey of what contemporary neuroscience has to say about the nature of instinct. Actually, as it turns out, it might be more accurate to say the "nurture" of instinct, since Blumberg firmly argues against the perspective that what we think of as instincts are innate—he reframes "instincts," ranging from a baby's tendency to mimic faces to monkeys' fear of snakes, as a consequence of reflexes rather than innate knowledge. Though initially a bit dense with scientific jargon, the book picks up midway through, and the then generally accessible prose skillfully unpacks behaviors that seem instinctive, ranging from the mundane (getting thirsty) to the astonishing (androgenital licking in newborn rats). The writing is as persuasive as it is rich in intriguing detail, and a reader may well find that, by the end of the book, the word "nativism" (the perspective that animals and humans are born with cognitive instincts in place, which Blumberg at one point calls "an intellectual and experimental red herring") has become a dirty word.

Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics by Paul Glimcher

Parts of this book were recently profiled in The New Yorker; however, it may be a little heady for us.

From Scientific American
The notion that the brain and central nervous system are made of circuits that process stimuli and evoke bodily responses is a founding principle of neuroscience. And we humans believe that once we understand every neural pathway, we will be able to predict a motor response to every sensory input—from feeling the tug of a fish on a hook to catching your spouse in bed with someone else. All we have to do is build the right deterministic model of the brain. In Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics, Paul W. Glimcher, an associate professor of neural science and psychology at New York University, recounts how the history of neuroscience has brought humankind to this reflex-based model—and then explains why it is insufficient. Simple behaviors might arise from stimulus-response rules, he allows, but complex behaviors are far less predictable. For example, the brain can weigh value and risk, even with incomplete or uncertain information. But how? Fortunately, Glimcher points out, there is already a science to answer that question: economics, particularly game theory. Other scientists have tapped economic theory to explain the natural world. In the 1960s certain ecologists used the discipline to model how animals forage for food and choose a mate. Glimcher makes a case that "neuroeconomics" can complete our understanding of our brains. He cites his own experiments on humans and monkeys to show how economic principles can accurately represent intricate thought processes, in situations rife with competing values and interests. As the book proceeds, the going can get tough, but the historical insight is worth the trip. Readers may feel a bit unsatisfied when Glimcher notes that a unified theory of neuroeconomics has yet to be written and then admits that he doesn’t know what this theory would look like. Yet he rises to the occasion by suggesting how scientists could begin to apply neuroeconomics to define the optimal course of action that a person might select and by providing a mathematical route for deriving that solution. In this way, Glimcher says, scientists can devise a better understanding of how the brain makes complex decisions in an uncertain world.

Freedom And Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, And Political Power (Searle) [Amazon, $24.50]

Our self-conception derives mostly from our own experience. We believe ourselves to be conscious, rational, social, ethical, language-using, political agents who possess free will. Yet we know we exist in a universe that consists of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles. How can we resolve the conflict between these two visions?

In Freedom and Neurobiology, the philosopher John Searle discusses the possibility of free will within the context of contemporary neurobiology. He begins by explaining the relationship between human reality and the more fundamental reality as described by physics and chemistry. Then he proposes a neurobiological resolution to the problem by demonstrating how various conceptions of free will have different consequences for the neurobiology of consciousness.

In the second half of the book, Searle applies his theory of social reality to the problem of political power, explaining the role of language in the formation of our political reality. The institutional structures that organize, empower, and regulate our lives-money, property, marriage, government-consist in the assignment and collective acceptance of certain statuses to objects and people. Whether it is the president of the United States, a twenty-dollar bill, or private property, these entities perform functions as determined by their status in our institutional reality. Searle focuses on the political powers that exist within these systems of status functions and the way in which language constitutes them.

Searle argues that consciousness and rationality are crucial to our existence and that they are the result of the biological evolution of our species. He addresses the problem of free will within the context of a neurobiological conception of consciousness and rationality, and he addresses the problem of political power within the context of this analysis.

In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of the Mind (Kandel) [Amazon, $19.77]

When, as a medical student in the 1950s, Kandel said he wanted to locate the ego and id in the brain, his mentor told him he was overreaching, that the brain had to be studied "cell by cell." After his initial dismay, Kandel took on the challenge and in 2000 was awarded a Nobel Prize for his groundbreaking research showing how memory is encoded in the brain's neuronal circuits. Kandel's journey into the brain spans five decades, beginning in the era of early research into the role of electrical currents flowing through neurons and ending in the age of genetic engineering. It took him from early studies of reflexes in the lowly squid to the founding of a bioengineering firm whose work could some day develop treatments for Alzheimer's and on to a rudimentary understanding of the cellular mechanisms underlying mental illness. Kandel's life also took him on another journey: from Vienna, which his Jewish family fled after the Anschluss, to New York City and, decades later, on visits back to Vienna, where he boldly confronted Austria's unwillingness to look at its collusion in the Final Solution. For anyone considering a career in science, the early part of this intellectual autobiography presents a fascinating portrait of a scientist's formation: learning to trust his instincts on what research to pursue and how to pose a researchable question and formulate an experiment. Much of the science discussion is too dense for the average reader. But for anyone interested in the relationship between the mind and the brain, this is an important account of a creative and highly fruitful career.

Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundation of Religion by Todd Tremlin

Book description from Amazon: Around the world and throughout history, in cultures as diverse as ancient Mesopotamia and modern America, human beings have been compelled by belief in gods and developed complex religions around them. But why? What makes belief in supernatural beings so widespread? And why are the gods of so many different people so similar in nature? This provocative book explains the origins and persistence of religious ideas by looking through the lens of science at the common structures and functions of human thought. The first general introduction to the "cognitive science of religion," Minds and Gods presents the major themes, theories, and thinkers involved in this revolutionary new approach to human religiosity. Arguing that we cannot understand what we think until we first understand how we think, the book sets out to study the evolutionary forces that modeled the modern human mind and continue to shape our ideas and actions today. Todd Tremlin details many of the adapted features of the brain -- illustrating their operation with examples of everyday human behavior -- and shows how mental endowments inherited from our ancestral past lead many people to naturally entertain religious ideas. In short, belief in gods and the social formation of religion have their genesis in biology, in powerful cognitive processes that all humans share. In the course of illuminating the nature of religion, this book also sheds light on human nature: why we think we do the things we do and how the reasons for these things are so often hidden from view. This discussion ranges broadly across recent scientific findings in areas such as paleoanthropology, primate studies, evolutionary psychology, early brain development, and cultural transmission. While these subjects are complex, the story is told here in a conversational style that is engaging, jargon free, and accessible to all readers. With Minds and Gods, Tremlin offers a roadmap to a fascinating and growing field of study, one that is sure to generate interest and debate and provide readers with a better understanding of themselves and their beliefs.

Moral Minds by Marc Hauser

From Publishers weekly: How do humans develop their capacity to make moral decisions? Harvard biologist Hauser (Wild Minds) struggles to answer this and other questions in a study that is by turns fascinating and dull. Drawing on the linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky, Hauser argues that humans have a universal moral grammar, an instinctive, unconscious tool kit for constructing moral systems. For example, although we might not be able to articulate immediately the moral principle underlying the ban on incest, our moral faculty instinctually declares that incest is disgusting and thus impermissible. Hauser's universal moral grammar builds on the 18th-century theories of moral sentiments devised by Adam Smith and others. Hauser also asserts that nurture is as important as nature: "our moral faculty is equipped with a universal set of rules, with each culture setting up particular exceptions to these rules." All societies accept the moral necessity of caring for infants, but Eskimos make the exception of permitting infanticide when resources are scarce. Readers unfamiliar with philosophy will be lost in Hauser's labyrinthine explanations of Kant, Hume and Rawls, and Hauser makes overly large claims for his theory's ability to guide us in making more moral, and more enforceable, laws. (Sept. 1)

Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness (Humphrey) [Amazon, $13.57]

Humphrey's History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness (1992) elaborates the ideas distilled in this digestible precis. Based on the author's Harvard University lectures, it directly addresses the reader as a fellow contemplator of consciousness. That every person knows what it is but cannot give a convincing description of it, is the nettle Humphrey grasps as he explains his view of the problem. Figuratively seating the reader in his darkened lecture hall, Humphrey illuminates a monochromatic screen--red in this case. By what psychological pathway does the viewer experience the redness of the screen? Humphrey classifies the experience of initial stimulation as a subjective "sensation," which through internal feedback loops becomes an objective "perception" of the screen as red. Holding that this cognitive process may be the origin of self-awareness, Humphrey parries criticisms of the theory, and follows the allusion to the academic debate with a narrative of his sensation/perception mechanism evolving from microbe to mankind. Illustrating his argument with the musings of poets and painters, Humphrey stylishly inspires curiosity about consciousness.

Selections on Neuroethics from books like:

Neuroethics (Illes, ed.) [Amazon, $58.90]
Mind and Morals (May, Friedman, Clark, eds.) [Amazon, $32.00]
Neuroethics: Mapping the Field (Marcus, ed.) [Amazon, $9.31]
Natural Ethical Facts (Casebeer) [Amazon, $19.00]

We might also look at articles by Joshua Greene, who is a Harvard philosopher widely recognized for his work on ethics and neuroscience. See his web site.

Sunday, September 24, 2006

Brain Dissection Video

Check out this fascinating video of brain dissection (Dissection 15), which I first learned about from Mind Hacks. The video is used for an anatomy class, not neuroscience, so the level of detail is rather course, but for those of us who never had the opportunity to saw off the top of someone's skull and run our fingers through a human brain, this is a real eye-opener.

Wednesday, August 23, 2006

Fall 2006 book selection

The Cognitive Neuroscience Discussion Group will be meeting every other Wednesday at noon (starting September 6) in SC 300. We'll discuss the Simon Baron-Cohen book The Essential Difference: Male and Female Brains and the Truth About Autism (Amazon, Barnes&Noble). We should probably have read Chapter 1 by the first meeting.

Tuesday, March 07, 2006

New Books Reviewed

The Washington Post has a review of three neuroscience books: Gray Anatomies: Can neuroscience really explain our deepest thoughts and emotions? The reviewer is Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi.

THE THREE-POUND ENIGMA, The Human Brain and the Quest to Unlock Its Mysteries
By Shannon Moffett
Algonquin. 309 pp. $24.95

THE CREATING BRAIN: The Neuroscience of Genius
By Nancy C. Andreasen
Dana. 197 pp. $23.95

THE MATURE MIND: The Positive Power of the Aging Brain
By Gene D. Cohen
Basic. 232 pp. $24.95

Csikszentmihalyi begins his review with
During the past half century or so, we have seen enormous advances in mapping the brain and its functions. We now know which area of the brain controls the movement of each finger and how religious ecstasy looks when translated into colored patches on a computer screen. No wonder scientists are beginning to feel ready to communicate the fruits of their labor to a general audience and to explain how knowledge of the brain will help us understand what we do, how we do it and why. Three slender new books are part of this recent trend of popularizing the brain sciences: All were written by professionals trained in the intricacies of gray matter.
He ends with a note of caution regarding the importance of the hardward over the software:
When we get to the more complex and interesting mental activities -- not only creativity but love, care, spirituality, play or aesthetic experience -- what is known about the brain still adds precious few insights to our understanding. As time goes on this is likely to change, but for now the concept of the mind, rather than the analysis of the brain, provides a better key to the more intricate events going on inside the head. The mind is not a material structure, with specific locations and functions. Its content is not hard-wired by genetic instructions, and it can evolve. The difference between a Hitler and a Mother Teresa is less likely to be found in the way their brains were arranged than in how they learned to connect their experiences. In the end, learning is etched into the structure of the brain and becomes indistinguishable from it. But at this point, it seems more useful to pay attention to how the software of the mind gets shaped, rather than hope for the hardware of the brain to yield answers to our deepest questions.
It's also clear that Hitler was the one with the moustache. .

Saturday, January 21, 2006

LL&H, chapters 1 & 2

Here are some links to ideas and concepts in chapters one & two.

Gourmand Syndrome:

Predictive Neural Coding of Reward Preference Involves Dissociable Responses in Human Ventral Midbrain and Ventral Striatum from Neuron 49, 157–166, January 5, 2006 (user="cns", PW="cns")

Sociobiology:

Wikipedia has a nice overview of Sociobiology with online nd external references. The notorious letter to the New York Review of Books that lashes out at Wilson and Sociobiology can be found here.

Evolutionary Psychology:

The recent Skeptic Magazine had a debate between David Buller, challenging the claim of EP, and Frank Miele, defending EP against Buller. Check out Buller's Guided Tour of EP and other articles at his home page.

Cosmides and Tooby offer a Primer on Evolutionary Psychology

Selfish Genes:

You can visit Richard Dawkins homepage, which has lots of his own articles and interesting links. A brief summary of the main ideas is here.

Anterior Cingulate:

You can find out more about the anterior cingulate at wikipedia, and in an article from Science.

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Spring Book Selection

Our book selection for the spring of 2006 is Quartz and Sejnowski, Liars, Lovers, and Heroes: What the New Brain Science Reveals About How We Become Who We Are. We'll begin discussion on Wednesday, January 18 at noon in SC 200.