Social Neuroscience

Book Selection for Spring 2008

I put together a list of books we might consider for our discussion in spring 2008. I'm sure I forgot a few that were recommended to me recently, so let me know if there is something you'd like to see on the list that I left off. Please look the list over and get back to me with your favorites (perhaps name a few in rank order). I'll summarize the results sometime in the next two weeks and get back to you.

UC Philosophy Colloquia Fall 2007

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Larry Shapiro
Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin

“Making Sense of Mirror Neurons”

Abstract:
Although the question is at least as old as Aristotle, philosophers have said little about how to distinguish one sensory modality from another. Scientists (no offense to Aristotle) have fairly unreflectively assumed distinctions between sensory modalities. Clearly, we need answers to why one sensory modality is distinct from another in order to answer questions such as: How many sensory systems do human beings possess? What would count as evidence that an organism has a sensory system that human beings lack? Do prosthetic sensory systems (e.g. Paul Bach-y-rita's device that uses pressure points on the back or tongue to convey visual information) replicate or only simulate "real" sensory systems? Grice (1962) provided a useful starting point for answers to these questions. Coady, Roxbee Cox, and Heil have said a few things in response to Grice, but not until recently has the issue come alive again (Keeley, Gray, Nudds). In this paper I find fault with various proposals for the individuation of the senses and then provide listeners with the benefit of the correct answer. Perhaps surprisingly, consistent with my account of the senses, mirror neurons turn out to be sensory organs.


FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Rocco Gennaro
Professor of Philosophy, Indiana State University

“Representational Theories of Consciousness”

Abstract:
Consciousness continues to be one of the most important and perplexing areas of philosophy of mind. One popular philosophical approach to explaining consciousness is known as “representational theories of consciousness.” I'll begin with various definitional and background matters, such as "How is 'conscious' defined?" "What is a mental representation?" and "What is the relationship between consciousness and intentionality?" I will then discuss motivations for and varieties of representational theories. Such theories have in common the idea that conscious mental states can be explained in terms of representational (or intentional) relations and are generally
reductionistic in spirit. For example, the representationalist will typically hold that the phenomenal properties of experience (i.e. qualia) can be explained in terms of the experiences’ representational properties (or content). The central question to be answered is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? This talk will critically review a number of prominent representational theories, including first-order theories (e.g. Michael Tye), higher-order thought theory (e.g. David Rosenthal), the higher-order perception model (e.g. Bill Lycan), as well as self-representational approaches to consciousness. Thus, various representational theories will be explained and criticisms of each will be discussed. I also present my own preferred version of HOT theory.


FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30
4-6 PM
Room TBA

Valerie Hardcastle
Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the McMicken College of Arts and Sciences, University of Cincinnati

“Reduction, Emergence, and Complexity: The Case of Obesity”

Abstract
Reductionists and emergentists both assume that reality is hierarchically organized by part-whole relations. The real difference between the two ontological views turns on the notion of downward causation. In this presentation, I argue that neither approach, as traditionally understood, fits well with the latest experimental and theoretical advances in science. I illustrate this claim by looking at our current understanding of obesity
as an example.

Blumberg Discussions

This fall semester we will be discussing Mark Blumberg's book Basic Instinct. [Amazon] We'll every other Monday from noon to 1:00 in SC 200. Mark the following dates on your calendar:

September 17
October 1
October 22
November 5
November 19
December 3

Fall 2007 books

Here are some candidates for our reading group this semester.

Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, by Chris Frith (Blackwell, 2007). [Amazon, $24.95]

Inside your head there is an amazing labor-saving device; more effective than the latest high-tech computer. Your brain frees you from the everyday tasks of moving about in the world around you, allowing you to concentrate on the things that are important to you: making friends and influencing people. However, the 'you' that is released into this social world is also a construction of your brain. It is your brain that enables you to share your mental life with the people around you. Making up the Mind is the first accessible account of experimental studies showing how the brain creates our mental world. Using evidence from brain imaging, psychological experiments, and studies with patients, Chris Frith, one of the world's leading neuroscientists, explores the relationship between the mind and the brain.

How the Body Shapes the Mind, by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford, 2006). [Amazon, $25.45]

How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher's book aims to contribute to the formulation of that common vocabulary and to develop a conceptual framework that will avoid both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Gallagher pursues two basic sets of questions. The first set consists of questions about the phenomenal aspects of the structure of experience, and specifically the relatively regular and constant features that we find in the content of our experience. If throughout conscious experience there is a constant reference to one's own body, even if this is a recessive or marginal awareness, then that reference constitutes a structural feature of the phenomenal field of consciousness, part of a framework that is likely to determine or influence all other aspects of experience. The second set of questions concerns aspects of the structure of experience that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before we know it. They do not normally enter into the content of experience in an explicit way, and are often inaccessible to reflective consciousness. To what extent, and in what ways, are consciousness and cognitive processes, which include experiences related to perception, memory, imagination, belief, judgement, and so forth, shaped or structured by the fact that they are embodied in this way?

Why Choose This Book?: How We Make Decisions, by Read Montegue (Dutton Adult, 2006). [Amazon, $16.47]

Why do we choose chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream? Why do we select one lover rather than another? Baylor University neuroscientist Montague (now a fellow at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study) deftly marries psychology and neuroscience as he probes how we make choices. On one hand, decision making boils down to simple computation. Montague argues that our brains are efficient computational machines. But unlike computers, our brains fix on the goals of survival and reproduction, realizing that every hasty decision can be costly to the survival of the species. Our brains also harbor experiences (memories) that foster the choices we make. On the other hand, we can make choices that go against survival: for instance, we can choose to die for an idea. Why is that? Because, says Montague, human computations involve valuation, choosing between one value and another, requiring computation of cultural and psychological qualities. Although the notion of the brain as a computational machine can be traced at least as far back as Descartes, Montague adds new ideas to our understanding of how our brains compute. But his sometimes engaging and sometimes plodding book doesn't always explain the complex science for general readers.

Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, by Neil Levy (Cambridge,, 2007). [Amazon $34.65]

Neuroscience has dramatically increased understanding of how mental states and processes are realized by the brain, thus opening doors for treating the multitude of ways in which minds become dysfunctional. This book explores questions such as when is it permissible to alter a person's memories, influence personality traits or read minds? What can neuroscience tell us about free will, self-control, self-deception and the foundations of morality? The view of neuroethics offered here argues that many of our new powers to read ,alter and control minds are not entirely unparalleled with older ones. They have, however, expanded to include almost all our social, political and ethical decisions. Written primarily for graduate students, this book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the more philosophical and ethical aspects of the neurosciences.

Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior, by Mark Blumberg (Thunder's Mouth, 2006) [Amazon, $11.66]

This is a passionate (and at times polemical) survey of what contemporary neuroscience has to say about the nature of instinct. Actually, as it turns out, it might be more accurate to say the "nurture" of instinct, since Blumberg firmly argues against the perspective that what we think of as instincts are innate—he reframes "instincts," ranging from a baby's tendency to mimic faces to monkeys' fear of snakes, as a consequence of reflexes rather than innate knowledge. Though initially a bit dense with scientific jargon, the book picks up midway through, and the then generally accessible prose skillfully unpacks behaviors that seem instinctive, ranging from the mundane (getting thirsty) to the astonishing (androgenital licking in newborn rats). The writing is as persuasive as it is rich in intriguing detail, and a reader may well find that, by the end of the book, the word "nativism" (the perspective that animals and humans are born with cognitive instincts in place, which Blumberg at one point calls "an intellectual and experimental red herring") has become a dirty word.

The Amygdaloids

The Amygdaloids (with neuroscientist Joe LeDoux) play for the NYU graduation at Madison Square Garden.

Sapolsky on Stress

Robert Sapolsky talks about 'Stress, Neurodegeneration and Individual Differences.'



From Google Video

From Animal to Person

In this podcast Dan Dennett speaks speaks to the New York Academy of Sciences about the evolution of human culture. (From Science & the City)

Summer Book Suggestions

Below are three candidates for our summer reading group. Let me know if there are other suggestions. I'll post a survey soon with which we can select a book and a meeting time.

Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior (Blumberg) [Amazon, $11.66]
This is a passionate (and at times polemical) survey of what contemporary neuroscience has to say about the nature of instinct. Actually, as it turns out, it might be more accurate to say the "nurture" of instinct, since Blumberg firmly argues against the perspective that what we think of as instincts are innate—he reframes "instincts," ranging from a baby's tendency to mimic faces to monkeys' fear of snakes, as a consequence of reflexes rather than innate knowledge. Though initially a bit dense with scientific jargon, the book picks up midway through, and the then generally accessible prose skillfully unpacks behaviors that seem instinctive, ranging from the mundane (getting thirsty) to the astonishing (androgenital licking in newborn rats). The writing is as persuasive as it is rich in intriguing detail, and a reader may well find that, by the end of the book, the word "nativism" (the perspective that animals and humans are born with cognitive instincts in place, which Blumberg at one point calls "an intellectual and experimental red herring") has become a dirty word.

Why Choose This Book?: How We Make Decisions (Read Montague) [Amazon, $16.47]
From Publishers Weekly:
Why do we choose chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream? Why do we select one lover rather than another? Baylor University neuroscientist Montague (now a fellow at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study) deftly marries psychology and neuroscience as he probes how we make choices. On one hand, decision making boils down to simple computation. Montague argues that our brains are efficient computational machines. But unlike computers, our brains fix on the goals of survival and reproduction, realizing that every hasty decision can be costly to the survival of the species. Our brains also harbor experiences (memories) that foster the choices we make. On the other hand, we can make choices that go against survival: for instance, we can choose to die for an idea. Why is that? Because, says Montague, human computations involve valuation, choosing between one value and another, requiring computation of cultural and psychological qualities. Although the notion of the brain as a computational machine can be traced at least as far back as Descartes, Montague adds new ideas to our understanding of how our brains compute. But his sometimes engaging and sometimes plodding book doesn't always explain the complex science for general readers. (Nov.)

Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Peter J. Richerson, Robert Boyd) [Amazon, $19.00]
Humans are a striking anomaly in the natural world. While we are similar to other mammals in many ways, our behavior sets us apart. Our unparalleled ability to adapt has allowed us to occupy virtually every habitat on earth using an incredible variety of tools and subsistence techniques. Our societies are larger, more complex, and more cooperative than any other mammal's. In this stunning exploration of human adaptation, Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd argue that only a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution can explain these unique characteristics.

Not by Genes Alone offers a radical interpretation of human evolution, arguing that our ecological dominance and our singular social systems stem from a psychology uniquely adapted to create complex culture. Richerson and Boyd illustrate here that culture is neither superorganic nor the handmaiden of the genes. Rather, it is essential to human adaptation, as much a part of human biology as bipedal locomotion. Drawing on work in the fields of anthropology, political science, sociology, and economics—and building their case with such fascinating examples as kayaks, corporations, clever knots, and yams that require twelve men to carry them—Richerson and Boyd convincingly demonstrate that culture and biology are inextricably linked, and they show us how to think about their interaction in a way that yields a richer understanding of human nature.

In abandoning the nature-versus-nurture debate as fundamentally misconceived, Not by Genes Alone is a truly original and groundbreaking theory of the role of culture in evolution and a book to be reckoned with for generations to come.

Moral Minds links

Here are some links to sites that are related to our discussion of Marc Hauser's Moral Minds.

Rorty's review of MM in the NY Times.

Edsten and Richerson Review of MM at American Scientist Online.

The Books and Publicity page from Hauser's website.

Mixing Memory Blog: Where is morality in the brain? Sequel is here.

Brain Ethics Blog with an excellent bibliography of neuroethics readings.

The Moral Sense Test at Harvard.

Carl Zimmer Who's Life Would You Save? Discover (2004)

Neuroethics homepage at UPenn

Joshua Greene's home page is here, with links to many of his articles on neuroscientific research on ethics. Below are a few select articles:

Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul

I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine moral reasoning. These claims are strictly empirical, and I will defend them on the basis of the available evidence. Needless to say, my argument will be speculative and will not be conclusive. Beyond this, I will argue that if these empirical claims are true, they may have normative implications, casting doubt on deontology as a school of normative moral thought.

Joshua Greene, et al. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, Science 293 (2001)

In two functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.

Joshua Greene, et al. The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, Neuron 44 (2004)

Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize reasoning
and “higher cognition,” while more recent work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment according to which both “cognitive” and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes mutually competitive roles.